>The Kingston Data Traveler series drives have hardware crypto, but
>they're unlocked using a small program stored on separate cleartext
>partition. They're not cheap however. so after I lost mine I switched
>to truecrypt/veracrypt.
About $1 US per GB at Amazon for the Kingston DataTraveler Locker +
G3--do-able for me, since I typically pay close to the same price for
the rubberized non-encrypted Corsair drives.
>Given your sole purpose, however, have you totally ruled out
>automating the backup routine and baking-in file-level crypto?
I have a comprehensive network data backup system that automatically
copies data from my SAN to a 4 TB USB drive every night, and the
drive is taken offsite each day.
Not all of the data that needs to be backed up is stored on the
network/SAN though. Also, I'm a fan of redundant backup.
The reason I'm asking is primarily because one of our big
customers--tens of thousands of dollars in annual billing--has
recently introduced a requirement for us to carry "cyber insurance".
I will avoid the entire rant about the fact that this is a scam,
since, like many other IT trends that are also essentially scams,
this one seems to be unavoidably growing in popularity.
The insurance provider wants an assurance that all USB thumb drives
are encrypted. (It also wants all laptop hard drives to be encrypted,
and it wants my 4 TB offsite backup drives encrypted.)
So I am evaluating my options, one of which is to avoid much of the
problem by discontinuing use of thumb drives--at an increase in inconvenience.
I am opposed to essentially turning all of our computers into dumb
terminals and keeping all the data on the network. What's the point
of having computers at all then? Plus, I don't like single points of
failure. Without thumb drives I would have to force people to make
even greater use of network shares than they do now. And there would
be even more people sitting here twiddling their thumbs in the event
of a network outage.
The laptop thing is especially troubling to me. I can encrypt the
data drive on a laptop and require users to enter a password to
access it, but since the user can then set the drive to be
automatically decrypted without entering the password, and they are
likely to do so to avoid the annoyance of having to enter two
passwords to access the computer, the whole thing is mostly pointless.
As for encryption software that requires the user to be logged in as
administrator--has it occurred to anyone that it is more dangerous
for the typical computer user to be running an administrator account
on a Windows machine than it is for them to have their data on an
unencrypted USB stick? Too many programmers, IMO, overestimate the
ability of their customers to use computers safely or to cope with
complex interfaces. (Well, that's not the right way to put it; it's
more like most programmers can't change their personal mindsets to
encompass the limited abilities of the vast majority of the people
who have to use the software that they create. Making things simpler
and safer is too annoying for power-users and CLI-lovers to contemplate.)
The removable backup drives are using a Linux file system, and my
consultant tells me that there's probably an option to have just
these backup drives encrypted without also encrypting the data on the
SAN. Since there's limited access to these drives (just me and my
assistant), that's an option I can live with.
Thanks for everyone's help!
Ken